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INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND THE GREAT
TRANSFER PRICING DEBATE: THE
POSITION ADOPTED ON THE OTHER
SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC
Paul D. Hunston *
Michael W. Turner**
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the twentieth century, the number and size of
corporations and other business entities operating in and through more
than one country has grown beyond all recognition. Just as it was once
possible to claim that the sun never set on the British Empire,1 now the
presidents and chairmen of a large number of corporations-American,
European, Japanese and others--can quite truthfully claim that the sun
never sets on their multinational group. Such widespread operations, of
necessity, take place in a number of countries, many of which have radi-
cally different tax systems and rates of taxation.2 It would be a fairly
simple matter for the financial controllers of multinational groups to or-
ganize the affairs of the various business entities which make up those
groups, be they corporations, branches, partnerships or joint ventures, so
as to channel profits out of a high tax jurisdiction into a low tax jurisdic-
tion or from a consistently profitable entity into one with accumulated
losses.
An obvious, although by no means the only, method of achieving an
effective movement of profits around a multinational group would be to
ensure that prices charged between members of the group for intra-group
transactions are maintained at either an artificially low or an artificially
* Mr. Hunston is a solicitor with the English law firm of Wiggin and Co, resident in
Wiggin and Co's UK office. Mr. Hunston specializes in corporate taxation and is the co-
author of Stamp Duty Reserve Tax, 3 L. & TAX REv. 82 (1986).
** Mr. Turner is a solicitor with the English law firm of Wiggin and Co. Mr. Turner is
the resident partner in the firm's Los Angeles office and specializes in international business
law. Mr. Turner is the first European lawyer to be licensed by the State Bar of California to
practice English and European law in the State, the license being granted to him in December
1989.
1. See J. Wilson [Christopher North], Noctes Ambrosianae, No. 20 (Apr. 1829) ("His
Majesty's dominions, on which the sun never sets").
2. See P. POsTLEWArrE, INTERNATIONAL CORPoRATE TAXATION § 401 (1980).
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high level. In the absence of effective legislation or regulations to counter
this practice, the intra-group price paid would be deductible for tax pur-
poses by the paying entity and taxable in the hands of the receiving en-
tity.3 If the former pays tax at a high rate, and the latter pays tax in a
low tax rate jurisdiction (not necessarily a traditional tax haven), or if the
former is consistently profitable whilst the latter has accumulated losses,
such a transaction could give rise to a significant tax saving for the group
as a whole and, conversely, a significant loss of revenue for the authori-
ties in the high tax jurisdiction. To prevent this practice, commonly re-
ferred to as transfer pricing, sophisticated legislation and policies have
developed fairly rapidly over the last fifty years, particularly in the tradi-
tionally high taxing jurisdictions of the world.'
Legislation to deal with transfer pricing was first introduced in the
United Kingdom in 1952,' and the basic rules have remained largely un-
altered since that date.' As in many other countries, however, the policy
of the United Kingdom's tax agency, Inland Revenue, on transfer pricing
has developed rapidly,7 and in recent years there has been a marked in-
crease in the number of taxpayers targeted for investigation.8 In the 1986
tax year, the Inland Revenue's central office completed ten transfer price
investigations which together resulted in adjustments to profits amount-
ing to almost £49 million.9 By 1987, this had risen to twenty-four cases
giving rise to adjustments of over £59 million ° and an immediate tax
yield of £14.8 million. 1 In the three months ending March 31, 1990, the
3. In the United Kingdom, the payment would be deductible as a trading expense by a
United Kingdom paying entity under general computation principles and taxable in the hands
of a United Kingdom resident as trading income within Case I of Schedule D of the Income
and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 18. Schedule D is one of the six schedular bases for
the assessment of income tax in the United Kingdom. Case I of Schedule D provides the basis
for the assessment of income arising from a trade.
4. See, eg., I.R.C. §§ 482, 925 (1988); Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1,
§ 770. By contrast, traditional tax havens such as the Isle of Man, Jersey, British Virgin Is-
lands and Panama have no legislation aimed at transfer pricing currently in force.
5. See Income Tax Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 10, § 469.
6. The legislation is now consolidated in the Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988,
ch. 1, § 770.
7. See The Transfer Pricing of Multinational Enterprises: Notes by the U.K. Inland Reve-
nue, 5 SIMON'S TAX INTELLIGENCE 42 (1981) [hereinafter Transfer Pricing].
8. REPORT OF THE COMISSIONERS OF HER MAJESTY'S INLAND REVENUE V 220 (Nov.
6, 1990).
9. This approximates $72.6 million, converted as of the exchange rate on December 31,
1986.
10. This approximates $111.2 million, converted as of the exchange rate on December 31,
1987.
11. This approximates $27.9 million, converted as of the exchange rate on December 31,
1987.
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Technical Division (International) of the Inland Revenue's head office,
which handles transfer pricing and controlled foreign companies legisla-
tion, concluded investigations which yielded additional tax of £43 mil-
lion,12 a significant proportion of which was derived from transfer
pricing investigations.
1 3
The Inland Revenue's determination to stamp out what it views as
an abuse of the transfer pricing rules is based on the significant amount
of revenue which it estimated to be lost by the United Kingdom.1 4 Its
ability to deal more effectively with the perceived abuse results not from
any change in the rules, which have remained largely unaltered since
1952, but rather in the ever-increasing sophistication of Inland Revenue
investigative techniques and from the ever-increasing cooperation be-
tween revenue authorities around the world.1
II. LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Legislation governing transfer pricing in the United Kingdom is
contained in sections 770 through 774 of the Income and Corporation
Taxes Act of 1988,16 with the principal charging provisions contained in
section 770.17
A. The Charge to Tax
1. Basic provisions
Section 770 provides that the Inland Revenue may substitute, for
tax purposes, a notional price equal to the price which the goods or serv-
ices would have fetched in an open market transaction for the active
price paid if both of the following are satisfied: (1) property, including
goods, services and other business facilities, is sold under circumstances
where the buyer controls the seller, or vice versa, or where both are
12. This approximates $70.8 million, converted as of the exchange rate on March 31, 1990.
13. Specialist teams within the head office undertake certain aspects of technical review
work and are part of the Technical Division (International), which handles major cases involv-
ing transfer pricing and the controlled foreign companies legislation. See TOLLEY's TAX
PLANNING 1220 (1991).
14. "The principle objective [of adjusting transfer prices] is to ensure that the U.K. tax-
payer is paying the proper U.K. tax on its profits under the law." Transfer Pricing, supra note
7, at 44.
15. Id. at 43.
16. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, §§ 770-774 (formerly incorporated in
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, ch. 4, § 485 and Income Taxes Act, 1952, 15 & 16
Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 10, § 469).
17. Id. § 770.
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under common control, and the property is sold at a price which is
either:
(i) less than the price which it might have been expected to
fetch if the parties to the transaction had been independent per-
sons dealing at arm's-length (the arm's-length price), or
(ii) greater than the arm's-length price;
and (2) the buyer resides and carries on a trade in the United Kingdom,
and the price paid by the buyer for the property is taken into account as a
deduction in computing the profits or losses of that trade for United
Kingdom tax purposes, or (where the actual price paid is greater than the
arm's-length price) the seller resides and carries on a trade in the United
Kingdom, and the price paid for the property is not to be taken into
account as a trading receipt in the United Kingdom in the hands of the
seller. 8
For example, XLtd., a United Kingdom resident, is a wholly owned
subsidiary of YLtd., and XLtd. sells an item to YLtd. for $5,000, which
YLtd. immediately sells to a third party for $10,000. If YLtd. is resi-
dent outside the United Kingdom, Inland Revenue may treat X Ltd. as if
it had disposed of the property for $10,000 and charge United Kingdom
corporation tax for this transaction, notwithstanding that X Ltd. will
only have received $5,000. Section 770 would not apply, however, if Y
Ltd. were a United Kingdom resident company whose profit on the
transaction ($5,000) would be brought into charge to United Kingdom
corporation tax, because in that circumstance no tax advantage would
arise.
2. Common control
Section 770 only applies to transactions between parties one of
which controls the other or both of which are under common control. 19
There are a number of different definitions of "control" for various pur-
poses contained in United Kingdom tax legislation. 20 For transfer pric-
ing purposes, a person-an individual, a company or a partnership-has
control of a company if that person has the power either to secure that
the affairs of the company in question are conducted in accordance with
18. Id. § 770(1), (2).
19. Id. § 770(l)(a).
20. See, e.g., Capital Allowances Act, 1990, ch. 1, § 161(2) (when a person, by means of
holding shares, voting power, or power conferred by articles of association, conducts affairs of
body corporate according to his wishes; when a person has right to share more than one-half
partnership assets or income); Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 416(2) (when
a person controls a company's affairs and possesses the greater part of the company's share
capital or assets).
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that person's wishes by virtue of holding shares or possessing voting
power, or by virtue of any powers conferred by the articles of association
of the company or any other document.21 A person has control of a
partnership if that person has the right to more than half of that partner-
ship's income or assets.22 In determining whether any person has control
of a company or a partnership, it should always be borne in mind that
that person will have attributed to him or her all of the rights and powers
of his nominees23 and of persons who are connected with him, which
would include his or her spouse, brothers, sisters, ancestors, lineal de-
scendants, partners and the spouses and nominees of such connected
persons. 24
For example, A will control A Ltd., a United Kingdom resident, if
the ordinary shares in A Ltd. are held as follows:
Shareholder No. of Shares
A 10,000 (10%)
A's nominees25  10,000 (10%)
A's wife 10,000 (10%)
A's brother 21,000 (21%)
B (unconnected with A) 49,000 (49%)
A will also control C Ltd., a company resident outside the United
Kingdom, where the shares in C Ltd. are held as follows:
Shareholder No. of Shares
A 1,000 (1%)
A's brother-in-law 20,000 (20%)
A's brother 10,000 (10%)
D Ltd.26  20,000 (20%)
B (unconnected with A) 49,000 (49%)
Under these circumstances, section 770 could also be applied to any
transaction between A Ltd. and C Ltd.
Interestingly, it has been held in the case of Inland Revenue Com-
missioner v. Lithgows, Ltd. 27 that co-trustees who hold shares in their
capacity as co-trustees do not individually control the company in which
they hold shares because, by virtue of the fiduciary duties they owe to the
21. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 840.
22. Id.
23. Nominees include other persons who exercise or possess rights or powers on behalf of
the shareholder. Id. § 773(3)(b).
24. Id.
25. Held as a nominee for A.
26. A company in which A owns 51% of the issued share capital.
27. 39 T.C. 270 (1960).
April 1991]
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beneficiaries of the trust, and to each other, they may not direct that the
affairs of the company are carried on in accordance with their own
wishes; rather, they are bound collectively to ensure that the affairs of the
company are carried on in accordance with the best interests of the bene-
ficiaries. 28 However, whilst on the subject of trusts, it should be noted
that a trustee in his capacity as such will be connected with any individ-
ual who in relation to the settlement is a settlor, and with any other
person who is connected with such settlor.29
3. Types of transactions affected
Clearly, section 770 applies to sales of goods and services between
connected persons.31 It is extended, with necessary adaptations, to "let-
ting and hiring of property, grants and transfers of rights, interests or
licenses and the giving of business facilities of whatever kind," 31 to loan
interest, patent royalties, management fees and payment for services.32
In addition, section 770 applies to contributions by a subsidiary towards
costs incurred by its parent company. 3
B. Determination of Arm's-Length Price
Assuming that a transaction falls within section 77034 and that it
occurred between connected parties, one of whom is a non-resident such
that a United Kingdom tax advantage may be obtained as a result of the
transaction, the next crucial question is whether that transaction has
been concluded at an arm's-length price.35 This, unfortunately, is where
the science of transfer pricing regulations becomes more of an art with
uncertain boundaries.
United Kingdom legislation does not contain any detailed rules
about transfer prices in particular circumstances and the Inland Revenue
28. Id. at 274. The authors are aware of instances, however, where Revenue Agents have
argued that the legislation can apply where the resident company is controlled by a non-resi-
dent company underlying a trust. This situation was not considered in Lithgows. See id. at
270-79.
29. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 839(3).
30. Id. § 770(l)(a) (transactions subject to this section include those where "property is
sold and.., the buyer is a body of persons over whom the seller has control or both the buyer
and the seller are bodies of persons over whom the same person or persons has or have
control").
31. Id. § 773(4).
32. Transfer Pricing, supra note 7, at 42-43.
33. Id. at 43.
34. It is suggested that there are very few transactions which would fall outside the poten-
tial scope of the section.
35. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 770(1)(b).
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is not prepared to give an advance ruling on transfer prices or to discuss
hypothetical situations. 36 The Inland Revenue has identified three meth-
ods of ascertaining an arm's-length price, namely the comparable trans-
actions method, the resale prices method and the costs plus method."
1. The comparable transactions method
The most obvious and, in theory, the easiest method of determining
an arm's-length price in any transaction is to compare the prices paid on
a particular transaction with prices which are generally paid on the open
market for similar types of transactions between unconnected persons.
The principal difficulty with the operation of this method is that the like-
lihood of finding another transaction where all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, apart from the connection between the parties, coincide with
the circumstances surrounding the relevant transaction is remote. The
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
38
recognized the difficulties surrounding this method and identified a
number of factors which may affect comparability of transactions, such
as the nature of the goods, packaging and brand name.39
A review of these factors shows clearly how difficult in practice the
comparable transactions method is to operate effectively, particularly as
the Inland Revenue is likely to be prevented by confidentiality rules from
disclosing information concerning the pricing arrangements of other
companies who are competing with the company whose pricing arrange-
ments are under investigation.' Accordingly, although in theory exami-
nation of comparable transactions is the easiest and fairest method of
evaluating any transaction under investigation, in practice it will usually
be very difficult to operate effectively. Therefore, the Inland Revenue in-
variably falls back on the other methods of determining an arm's-length
price, at least in the first instance.
2. The resale prices method
Appropriate generally to marketing activities, this method involves
taking the retail price obtained by the purchasing company on an even-
tual sale into the open market and deducting an appropriate mark up to
36. See Letter from Inland Revenue to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales (Apr. 25, 1986).
37. Transfer Pricing, supra note 7, at 44.
38. The OECD was established under the Convention for European Economic Co-opera-
tion, Dec. 14, 1960, 888 U.N.T.S. 143.
39. OECD COMM. ON FIscAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISES 13, 35-38 (1979).
40. See, eg., Taxes Management Act, 1970, ch. 9, § 6.
April 1991]
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cover that company's costs and a reasonable profit margin to give a re-
sulting arm's-length price for section 770 purposes.41 The critical issue
in arriving at an arm's-length price using this method is the appropriate
level of profit margin for the purchasing company. Factors which fre-
quently are taken into account include: (1) the exclusiveness of the pur-
chaser's marketing rights;42 (2) the level of risk assumed by the company
which will sell the goods into the open market;43 and (3) the amount of
work, if any, performed by the purchasing company on or in respect of
the goods in question.' Determining the level of profit invariably in-
volves comparison with similar transactions undertaken by other compa-
nies. This brings the Inland Revenue back to the practical difficulty of
obtaining the necessary information to make this comparison.
3. The costs plus method
This method involves the opposite approach to that adopted for the
resale prices method and consists of taking the cost incurred by the sell-
ing company in providing the goods or services in question and adding
an appropriate mark up to represent that company's profit margin.4 5
Factors similar to those discussed in relation to the resale prices method
as to the appropriate mark up level to be adopted must be examined
when using the costs plus method, and similar difficulties in determining
the mark up are likely to arise.
The OECD has acknowledged the difficulties of operating this
method in isolation" and, in particular, has identified a number of disad-
vantages of the method. For example, this method: (1) overemphasizes
historical cost, (2) ignores user demand, (3) fails to reflect competitive
conditions adequately, (4) assumes a guaranteed profit in all circum-
stances, and (5) ignores abnormal factors such as increased costs due to
poor management.4' Notwithstanding these stated difficulties, the
method is used particularly in circumstances where the resale prices
method is inappropriate 48 -for example, on a sale of semi-finished prod-
ucts between connected parties, perhaps involving further processing by
the purchaser-or as a method of checking figures obtained under one of
41. Transfer Pricing, supra note 7, at 44.
42. OECD COMM. ON FIscAL AFFAIRS, supra note 39, at 40.
43. Id. at 39.
44. Id.
45. Transfer Pricing, supra note 7, at 44.
46. OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 39, at 40.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 41.
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the other methods. 9
There are no figures published by the Inland Revenue on the fre-
quency of use of any particular method or combination of methods5° of
calculating arm's-length prices. However, regardless of the method
adopted, the Inland Revenue has stated that it will be guided by the prin-
ciples set out by the OECD"1 in arriving at an arm's-length price. 2 On
this basis the following principles are applied in practice:
(1) The Revenue authorities should not form their own com-
mercial judgment on any transactions and should rely on real
and not hypothetical cases in reaching their evaluation.
(2) Reasonable and consistently applied pricing arrangements
should not, as a general rule, be challenged, even where on oc-
casions such arrangements give rise, for whatever reason, to an
unusually high or low price.
(3) Subsidies, grants and price controls, other than those im-
posed between connected parties, should be taken into account.
(4) All benefits, and not just pure profit or loss, accruing to
either party must be given appropriate consideration. For ex-
ample, under certain circumstances it should be possible to jus-
tify uneconomic pricing policies where such policies are part of
a long-term coordinated strategy within the multinational
group involved.
In this way it is hoped that commercial realities can be observed
whilst, at the same time, the aims of the transfer pricing rules, namely
"to ensure that the U.K. taxpayer is paying the proper U.K. tax on its
profits under the law"5 3 can be achieved.
III. DOUBLE TAXATON
A. Generally
One knock on effect of a substitution by the Inland Revenue under
section 770 of a notional price for the actual price paid for goods or
services is the possibility that economic double taxation may arise where
no corresponding adjustment is made by the Revenue authorities in the
jurisdiction of residence of the other party to the transaction. For exam-
ple, assume A PLC, a United Kingdom resident, sells goods to B Inc., a
49. Id. at 40.
50. Methods may be utilized separately, in conjunction or as cross-checks. See id. at 33-
34.
51. See OECD COMM. ON FIscAL AF'AiRs, supra note 39.
52. Transfer Pricing, supra note 7, at 44.
53. Id.
April 1991]
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wholly owned subsidiary of A-PLC and a resident of Z country, at a price
of $10,000, and B Inc. immediately resells the goods to a third party for
$100,000. Under section 770, the Inland Revenue will have the right to
deem A PLC to have sold the goods for $100,000 for United Kingdom
tax purposes.5 4 The revenue authorities in Z country, however, would, in
the absence of any double tax agreement between the United Kingdom
and Z country,"5 be free to impose a tax charge on B Inc. on the basis
that it has made a profit of $90,000 on the transaction.
To avoid this double taxation, it is usual for double tax agreements
entered by the United Kingdom with other nations to include an article,
usually headed "Associated Enterprises," covering this problem and gen-
erally based on the provisions of article 9 of the OECD Model Conven-
tion.56 The model article provides that, where one contracting state has
charged tax on the basis of an arm's-length price, the other state is re-
quired to adjust the amount of tax which it charges on the same profits. 7
Provided that the two states are in agreement on the amount of the
arm's-length price," double taxation may be eliminated.
There are circumstances, however, where double taxation cannot be
eliminated in this way, either because the (1) revenue authorities cannot
agree on an arm's-length price, and the relevant treaty contains no dis-
pute mechanism or authority for the revenue authorities to consult on
the case,5 9 or (2) because the treaty does not contain the "Associated
Enterprises" article, or (3) because no treaty exists between the United
Kingdom and the country in question. In each of these cases the taxpay-
ing multinational corporation will have to rely either on the mutual
agreement procedure generally incorporated into United Kingdom tax
treaties for resolving double taxation or, where no treaty exists, on
United Kingdom domestic law offering unilateral relief in certain cir-
cumstances.' In either event, the group in question would be well ad-
54. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 770(1).
55. See. e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, United
States-United Kingdom, 31 U.S.T. 5668, T.I.A.S. No. 9682.
56. OECD MODEL CONVENTION ON THE TAXATION OF INCOME AND CAPITAL art. 9
(1977), reprinted in Brit. Int'l Tax Agreements (CCH) S 6-575, at 7724.
57. Id. art. 9(2), reprinted in Brit. Int'l Tax Agreements (CCH) 6-580, at 7724.
58. Treaties generally enable the revenue authorities of the two nations to consult each
other on this. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 11, 1979,
United Kingdom-Netherlands, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 77. The Convention between the
United Kingdom and the United States goes further by providing a mechanism for the resolu-
tion of disputes between the respective revenue authorities. See Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation, supra note 56, art. 9(3), 31 U.S.T. at 5677.
59. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 22, 1968, United
Kingdom-France, art. 8, 725 U.N.T.S. 3, 8.
60. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 790.
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vised to contact the Tax Policy Division (International) of the Inland
Revenue in an effort to resolve the difficulty.
B. The European Community Connection
For the time being, transactions between associated enterprises resi-
dent within two or more European Community member states, one of
which includes the United Kingdom, are treated in the same way as any
other international transaction, and the considerations relating to effec-
tive double taxation apply. On July 23, 1990, however, the European
Community Council formally adopted a draft directive and convention
regarding the elimination of double taxation relating to adjustment of
transfers of profits between associated enterprises." This convention,
which adopts the terms of a draft directive,62 provides for the creation of
a co-operation and arbitration procedure for situations where member
states cannot reach mutual agreement, as between themselves, regarding
an equitable elimination of double taxation arising as a result of an ad-
justment of profits (for example, under section 770) between companies
resident in two or more member states.63 Broadly, the draft directive
envisages that, if the relevant revenue authorities within the concerned
member states fail to reach an agreement eliminating the double taxa-
tion, they would be required to present the case to an arbitration com-
mission who would make a final decision on the matter."
For the time being this remains a European Community Council
convention and draft directive only. It is not a part of United Kingdom
law and, until it becomes a full directive, it cannot have direct effect in
the United Kingdom. Until then, transactions between the United King-
dom and other European Community member states are treated in the
same way as all other international transactions, with reliance being
placed on the relevant double tax treaty provisions discussed above.
IV. CoNDucT OF TRANSFER PRICING ENQUIRIES
A. Procedure
Transfer pricing enquiries in the United Kingdom are the responsi-
bility of the Board of the Inland Revenue, which maintains a network of
local offices throughout the United Kingdom. With the exception of en-
quiries relating to oil companies, which are dealt with by the centralized
61. 33 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 225) 10 (1990).
62. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 336) 15 (1977).
63. d at 17-19.
64. Id
Apri 1991]
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oil taxation office in London, most enquiries are handled, at least in the
first instance, by local inspectors, and only enquiries involving substantial
amounts of money or points of principle are dealt with at the Inland
Revenue central head office in London. In any event, wherever the
enquiry is handled, the objectives of the enquiring office will be the same,
namely to "ensure that the U.K. taxpayer is paying the proper U.K. tax
on its profits under the law.",
66
Most enquiries arise out of routine examinations of a company's ac-
counts carried out by local inspectors in preparation for the usual assess-
ment of tax liability on the profits of that company for a given chargeable
period. Increasingly, however, Inland Revenue agents are targeting par-
ticular businesses, for example the pharmaceutical industry, for the at-
tention of the Inland Revenue's specialist transfer pricing team. 7
Once a review is underway, the Inland Revenue can be expected to
raise protective tax assessments on the tax paying company so as to pre-
vent the tax claim becoming time-barred.68 Once the Inland Revenue
raises an assessment, interest and penalties on the tax so assessed will
begin to accumulate and, given the length of time which enquiries invari-
ably take69 and the fact that the Inland Revenue will usually insist on
interest and penalties being paid in respect of tax so assessed, 70 a tax-
payer should, on receipt of such an assessment, give consideration as to
how best to deal with what could amount to a significant interest and
penalty charge. In particular, serious consideration should be given to
the making of an investment in Certificates of Tax Deposit.
71
65. Transfer Pricing; supra note 7, at 43.
66. Id at 44.
67. 2 TOLLEY'S TAX PLANNING 1220 (1991). The Inland Revenue established its special-
ist team, composed of eight to ten people, to engage exclusively in transfer pricing work. Id.
68. An assessment would be time-barred after six years in the absence of fraud or negli-
gence, Taxes Management Act, 1970, ch. 9, § 34, or after twenty years where there has been
fraudulent or negligent conduct, id. § 36.
69. In the authors' experience, the time taken for enquiries can be anything from a matter
of a few weeks to a number of years, depending upon the complexity of the issues involved and
the willingness of both sides to the negotiations to compromise.
70. Interest on late paid tax generally accrues pursuant to Taxes Management Act, 1970,
ch. 9, § 86. In concluding negotiated settlements, the Inland Revenue has the power to effec-
tively waive charges by simply issuing a revised tax assessment for the tax involved. In the
authors' experience, however, interest and penalties are rarely waived in the case of transfer
pricing enquiries.
71. Certificates of Tax Deposit are cash deposit certificates issued by the Inland Revenue
which carry a favorable rate of tax-free interest, tied to the rate of interest on unpaid tax, if
utilized to meet a tax liability. See Prospectus for Certificates of Tax Deposits, reprinted in
SIMON'S TAxEs, Dec. 6, 1990, A3.1328, at 1098.
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B. Information Requirements
Where, for whatever reason, Inland Revenue agents decide that it is
appropriate to examine the pricing policies of a taxpayer, it is likely that
the Revenue will need to embark on a fact-finding exercise to elicit infor-
mation in addition to that which has led them to determine that an en-
quiry is appropriate. What additional information will be required
depends upon individual circumstances. The Inland Revenue does not
have a standard list of questions but the following matters are likely to
be of interest to the Revenue in connection with the taxpayer itself:
(1) ownership and/or control of the taxpayer;
(2) the nature of its trade;
(3) the organization of the group of which the taxpayer is a
member;
(4) the functions of particular companies within the group; and
(5) how far the profitability of particular companies within the
group has come up to expectations.72
In addition, it is likely, depending on which arm's-length pricing
method is adopted, that the Revenue will at some stage need to enquire
into some or all of the following matters:
(1) the open market prices of goods or services comparable to
those supplied by or to the taxpayer;
(2) production costs;
(3) research and development costs; and
(4) the price at which the multinational group of which the
taxpayer is a part ultimately sells the goods into the open
market.
7
C. Sources of Information
Generally, transfer pricing enquiries in the United Kingdom are re-
solved through discussions and negotiations between the inspector and
the taxpayer, during the course of which the taxpayer is usually able to
supply the necessary information which the inspector will require. In the
unlikely event that an inspector is unable to persuade a taxpayer to pro-
vide information which the inspector considers relevant, the Inland Rev-
enue has fairly wide-ranging statutory powers to request information
from a taxpayer.7 4 In addition, section 772 of the Income and Corpora-
72. Transfer Pricing, supra note 7, at 43.
73. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
74. See, eg., Taxes Management Act, 1970, ch. 9, § 20. That section provides, in perti-
nent part:
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tion Taxes Act75 empowers the Inland Revenue in the case of enquiries
into transactions with section 770 to: (1) require the taxpayer to produce
information relating to its transfer prices and also which is or may be
relevant to the transfer prices of other entities, regardless of whether such
entities are associated with the taxpayer;76 (2) require the production of
books and accounts or other relevant documents or records of the tax-
payer and, in certain circumstances, the taxpayer's subsidiaries; 77 and (3)
in certain circumstances, to enter premises used in connection with a
trade carried on by a taxpayer which is believed to be a party to a trans-
action within section 770 to inspect books, accounts or any other docu-
ments or records whatsoever relating to that trade.78
D. Confidentiality of Information
Information acquired by the Inland Revenue during the course of a
transfer pricing enquiry is subject to very strict confidentiality rules.7 9
However, it should be noted that disclosure of such information is per-
mitted in the case of disclosure by the Inland Revenue to Her Majesty's
Customs and Excise and, probably more important, in the case of disclo-
sure to the revenue authorities of other countries under double tax agree-
ments or under directives concerning mutual assistance between the
revenue authorities of the member states of the European Community. 0
E. Section 770 Notices
Most transfer pricing enquiries are resolved as a result of negotia-
tions between the Inland Revenue and the taxpayer without the tax in-
spector ever having to resort to formal notification proceedings under
section 770.11 Where agreement on the substitution of an arm's-length
(2) Subject to this section, the Board may by notice in writing require [a person-
(a) to deliver to him such documents as are in his possession or power and
as... contain information relevant to-
(i) any tax liability to which that person is or may be subject, or
(ii) the amount of any such liability, or
(b) to furnish to him such particulars as the inspector may reasonably re-
quire as being relevant to, or to the amount of, any such liability.]
Id. § 20(2).
75. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 772.
76. d § 772(1).
77. Id § 772(3).
78. Id § 772(6).
79. See Taxes Management Act, 1970, ch. 9, § 6.
80. See Council Directive, 20 0.3. EuR. COMM. (No. L 336) 15 (1977).
81. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 770(2)(d); see also id. § 772(6)
(authorizing investigation procedures for the Board to determine whether § 770 direction need
be given).
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price in any transaction cannot be reached, the Inland Revenue is re-
quired to serve a direction on the taxpayer under section 770 before the
provisions of the section can apply to the transaction and a correspond-
ing assessment raised. 2
Once a direction has been made, the direction itself cannot be ap-
pealed. Instead, the taxpayer must appeal to the Special Commission-
ers83 against the assessment raised by the Inland Revenue as a result of
the direction and, in determining the appeal; the onus lies on the tax-
payer to show that no direction under section 770 should have been given
or that the arm's-length price substituted by the Inland Revenue is
inappropriate."
V. TRANSFER PRICING PLANNING
The incidence of transfer price enquiries in the United Kingdom,
although still not of a great number, is on the increase. The same is true
in many other developed countries where complex transfer pricing regu-
lations are becoming commonplace.8 5 With this in mind, every multina-
tional group should examine on a regular basis its intra-group pricing
policies to ensure that they clearly are established and able to stand up to
detailed investigation. The policies should, wherever possible, be docu-
mented and should be applied consistently with any exceptions to the
stated policies being clearly justifiable. Where possible, any major trans-
actions between connected entities which may be vulnerable to a section
770 investigation should be documented individually, and any unusual
items or considerations involved in the transaction highlighted with the
thought process behind them made clear.
As to the actual policies to be adopted, these will obviously depend
on the individual circumstances of the group in question. United King-
dom legislation incorporated in section 770 deals with general charging
provisions and, therefore, is of little use in helping develop appropriate
policies. Even the guidelines issued by the Inland Revenue86 do little
more than set out the Inland Revenue's thinking on certain transfer pric-
ing issues in very general terms-the notes are of very little practical
assistance.
82. Id. § 770(2)(d)(3).
83. Id. § 772(8).
84. Taxes Management Act, 1970, ch. 9, § 50(6).
85. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 482, 925 (1988); "Verwaltungsgrundsatze Zu Verrechnung-
spreisen" (Feb. 1983) (Ger.).
86. See Transfer Pricing, supra note 7.
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The OECD has produced a number of reports on transfer pricing87
which examine the area in some detail and which throughout give practi-
cal information which may provide guidance when seeking to establish
and maintain a transfer price policy. Clearly, the Inland Revenue is not
bound by the thoughts of the OECD. However, representatives from the
Inland Revenue were involved in the preparation of these reports, and it
is likely that the Reports will influence the views not only of the Inland
Revenue, but also of revenue authorities around the world. For this rea-
son, if for no other, the reports provide at the very least, an invaluable
bench mark against which multinational groups can start to evaluate
their own pricing policies. This is so not only within the United King-
dom which, whilst it has its own peculiarities in terms of transfer pricing
legislation and policy rules, is seeking to achieve through that legislation
objectives similar to those which many other countries throughout the
world are seeking to achieve with their own transfer pricing rules, but
throughout the world.
87. See, eg., OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
(1987); OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL EN-
TREPRISES-THREE TAXATION ISSuES (1984); OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra
note 39.
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